Posts Tagged ‘science communication’

OLYMPUS DIGITAL CAMERANote: I have joined the “virtual class” component of Dan Kahan‘s Science of Science Communication course at Yale University. As part of this I am endeavoring to write a response paper in reaction to each week’s set of readings. I will post these responses here on my blog – my paper for week ten is below. Previous responses are here. I will also be participating in the discussion on Kahan’s own blog.

This week’s “questions to consider” (a reading list is here):

1. What is the relationship—empirically—between “accepting”/“believing in” the evolution and “understanding”/“comprehending” it?  Are they correlated with one another? Does the former have a causal impact on latter?  Vice versa?
2. What is the relationship—psychologically— between “accepting”/“believing in” the evolution and “understanding”/“comprehending” it? Is it possible to “comprehend” or “know” without “believing in” evolution?  Can someone “disbelieve” or “not accept” evolution and still use knowledge or comprehension of it to do something that knowledge of it requires?  Are there things that people are enable to do by “belief” or “disbelief in” evolution?  If the answer to the last two questions are both “yes,” can one person use knowledge or comprehension to do some things and disbelief to do others?  What does it mean to “believe in” or “disbelieve in” evolution? Is it correct to equate the mental operation or state of “believing” or “disbelieving” in evolution with the same mental state or operation that is involved in, say, “believing” or “disbelieving” that one is currently sitting in a chair?
3. What—normatively—is (should be) the aim of teaching evolution: “belief,” “knowledge,” or “both”?
4. If one treats attainment of “knowledge “or “comprehension” as the normative goal, how should science educators regard students’ “beliefs”?
5. If one treats attainment of “knowledge” or “comprehension” as the normative goal of science education, how should one regard political or cultural conflict over belief in evolution?

My response:

The empirical relationship between knowledge, understanding and belief

The evidence points strongly towards a distinction between knowledge and belief, for the simple reason that so many students have been able to demonstrate the former without the latter (or vice-versa):

  • In Hermann’s (2012) study, there was no statistical difference in understanding of evolution concepts between two extreme sub-groups of students, one believing in evolution and the big bang theory, and one not.
  • Sinatra 2003 (cited in Hermann) similarly suggests no relationship between belief and understanding of evolution
  • Blackwell found what could be termed a disjoint between understanding/application and belief: although an overwhelming majority of students selected appropriate answers when asked to categorize examples of specific evolutionary processes, the percent considering evolution the primary basis for progression of life on earth was 34-35 percent (with slightly different percentages for the two classes surveyed). The percent considering evolution compatible with their belief system was 27-29%, but only 6-9% said they could never believe in evolution.
  • Other studies found that it is common for students to believe in evolution without understanding it (Lord and Marino 1993, Bishop and Anderson 1990, Demastes-Southerland et al 1995, Jakobi 2010, all cited in Hermann).
A section from Blackwell's study, in which students had to categorize examples of various evolutionary processes.

A section from Blackwell’s study, in which students had to categorize examples of various evolutionary processes.

On the other hand, according to Hermann, several studies (Lawson and Worsnop 1992, Sinclair and Pendarvis 1997, Rutledge and Mitchell 2002) found that adherence to a religious belief system influenced the extent to which evolution was understood.

Defining our terms: the psychological relationship between knowledge, understanding and belief

The vagueness of the terms “belief,” “understanding” and “knowledge” obviously should give us pause when we are trying to make sense of these empirical findings.

I think we should try to define the terms in the way that is most fruitful to the problem at hand (while also seeking as much as possible not to create conflict with existing common usage, and to allow the above empirical findings to be applied). That problem is often put thusly, “Many students understand evolution, or demonstrate knowledge of evolution, without believing in it. Does this matter, and if so, what should we do about it?”

With this in mind we can come up with some rough working definitions:

  • Knowledge: Retained and retrievable true facts about physical properties and processes.
  • Understanding: A deeper form of knowledge accomplished by forming multiple connections between true facts on the subject at hand (evolution) and between the subject and others. (Similar to Gauld 2001’s definition, cited by Smith 2004.) An example of one such connection may be between a scientific theory and its supporting evidence (as suggested by Shipman 2002, cited by Hermann).
  • Belief: A committed, often emotional attachment to a proposition, which itself may be true or untrue, falsifiable or not. I would argue that it is sensible to talk both of faith-based belief in religious precepts, and of belief in scientific theories, which can be driven by thorough understanding of their scientific basis, or by blind faith in scientists. (I subscribe to the summary by Gess-Newsome 1999 [cited by Smith], of knowledge as “evidential, dynamic, emotionally-neutral”, and belief as “both evidential and non-evidential, static, emotionally-bound.”)

These definitions mesh well, I believe, with most of the empirical findings we read about this week, including Hermann, Smith and Everhart (2013). Hermann, for example, builds on Cobern’s partitioning concept to conclude that religious students view science ideas as “facts,” categorized differently than beliefs, which have a stronger emotional attachment. This helps students compartmentalize because they have created an “emotional distance” between scientific conceptions and religious beliefs.

In creating these definitions I have had to dismiss definitions that I think are unhelpful for the problem at hand. For example, according to Hermann, Cobern (1996) stated that knowing “is the metaphysical process by which one accepts a comphrehended concept as true or valid.” But this definition is actually much more like belief, as most of this week’s reading understands it.

I’ve also had to discard the philosophical convention that belief is a necessary condition of knowledge (Smith). When describing the way that people learn, and knowledge acquisition’s interaction with existing belief systems, this stipulation just doesn’t make sense (given the evidence we have of knowledge without belief). By casting off the impractical philosophical definition, I resolve a problem that Smith recognized – that if knowledge is dependent on belief, science education must foster belief.

There will always, I think, be messy edges and overlap between these realms. For example, it is hard to think of much useful knowledge that we can retain as utterly isolated “facts.” Facts that are part of a coherent schema are easier to retain or retrieve. We do, however, remember groups of facts that are connected in greater or lesser degree, both to each other and to other facts and schema in our brains. The difference between knowledge and understanding is thus one of degree.

Is lack of belief a problem? Or is it lack of understanding?

It should be noted that the issue with religious students’ non-belief in evolution is not merely one of semantics or a confusion of terms. The problem is we are not satisfied with students merely believing evolution in the way that they believe in discredited Lamarckian or Ptolomeic ideas. We don’t want them simply to believe “that evolution says x”: that implies that evolution has no special empirical status and it may as well be false, as those outdated scientific theories are. A student who can say only “that evolution says x” is merely parroting scientific language. She is in truth only a historian of science rather than truly a scientist herself – and I think that’s what so bothers us about the learning outcomes exhibited by students like Aidan and Krista, in Hermann’s study. We come away with the sense that their knowledge falls short of true scientific understanding.

I agree with Smith, however, that we should not go so far as to seek or require belief – or perhaps, I might say, “complete belief.” It is not and should not be the goal of a science class to completely overhaul students’ worldview, religion and all.

What we are seeking is for students to believe something like:

“Evolution, which says x, is the best supported scientific way of understanding the origins of various species, the way species adapt to their environment, etc etc.” (A conclusion similar to Smith 2004.)

And this requires an understanding of evolution, in the strong sense of understanding, which encompasses comprehension of justification. One may even argue that this type of belief follows necessarily from strong understanding: that is, if you understand mechanism of and scientific basis for evolution, and the comparative paucity of scientific explanation for other theories of species’ origins, then you will necessarily believe that “Evolution, which says x, is the best supported… etc, etc.” This could be a neat logical maneuver to employ because it means that we can avoid talking about the need for students to “believe in” evolution – which carries a lot of nasty cultural baggage – and just talk about understanding instead.

While several empirical studies have demonstrated that students can easily demonstrate knowledge of evolution without belief in evolution, understanding is a much more slippery eel. As previously alluded to, understanding encompasses a wide spectrum, starting from a state barely stronger than plain knowledge. But I would argue that understanding evolution, in its strong form, encompasses an understanding of the scientific justification for the theory of evolution – and that necessitates an understanding of the nature of science (NOS) itself.

Nature of science: the path to strong understanding of evolution

The best tactic for accomplishing this right kind of evolution belief, or strong understanding – and happily, a key to solving much else that is wrong with science education today – is to place much more emphasis on the scientific method and the epistemology of science. This includes addressing what sorts of questions can be addressed by science, and what can’t; and also the skeptical, doubtful tension within science, in which things are rarely “proven” yet are for good reason “believed.” Crucially this involves helping students to understand the true meaning of “scientific theory,” whose misunderstanding often underpins further misconceptions about evolution’s truth status.

This effort also involves exploring the tension between self discovery and reliance on authority – acknowledging that it is important for students to learn to operate and think like scientists, and we want as much as possible for them to acquire knowledge in this way: but that the world is far too complex for us all to gather our own data on everything. So students must learn how to judge the studies and reasoning of others, how to determine what evidence from others is applicable to what conclusions or situations, and how to judge who is a credible expert.

Misunderstandings of the nature of science (as well as certain broad scientific concepts) often lie at the heart of disbelief in evolution, as Hermann illustrates. In his qualitative study, both students showed a poor understanding of the methods and underlying philosophy of science, displaying a need for truth and proof – despite their good science knowledge performance.

Smith, rather inadvertently, gave another example of this problem. He cites a student who wrote to Good (2001):

I have to disagree with the answers I wrote on the exam. I do not believe that some millions of years ago, a bunch of stuff blew up and from all that disorder we got this beautiful and perfect system we know as our universe… To say that the universe “just happened” or “evolved” requires more faith than to believe that God is behind the complex organization of our solar system…”

Good uses this passage to justify making belief a goal of science education. Smith takes a contrary view, that “meaningful learning has indeed occurred when our four criteria of understanding outlined above have been achieved – even if belief does not follow” (emphasis in original). Instead I would argue that the student does not understand evolution in a meaningful way, having false impressions of underlying scientific and philosophical concepts such as entropy, order, and Occam’s razor.

Will nature-of-science education work with all students?

The research outlined above shows a mixed prognosis for our ability to overcome these issues and foster belief in the evolution proposition. Everhart’s work with Muslim doctors suggests that most participants considered subtly different meanings of the theory of evolution, and could consider evolution in relation to different contexts, such as religion and practical applications, with attitudes to evolution changing when the relative weights of these meanings were shifted. These meanings include a professional evaluation of the theory that could be held distinct from other evaluations. This suggests that participants may recognize the truth of evolution within a science epistemology framework, which should be sufficient for belief in our proposition, and not give evolution the same status within other, more personal epistemologies.

But Hermann suggests that students ultimately fail in integrating science and religion, which creates a fear of losing religious faith, causing the student to cling to the religious view while further compartmentalizing science concepts. This drives at the hard, hard problem at hand: even with a perfect understanding both of evolution and of the nature of science, religious students are likely to run into areas of conflict that create psychological discomfort. This is because the epistemic boundaries of science and religion are neither hard nor perfect. Some of the areas that science claims as well within its remit to explain – such as the age of the earth – run into competing claims from religion.

One way out of this conundrum is for a student to redraw the boundaries – to say, OK, I accept the scientific method where it does not conflict with my faith; but on this matter I must reject it. Hermann’s subjects appear to have done this to a certain extent, but run up against limits. I would hypothesize that this line-drawing process itself leads to further discomfort, especially among students who are brighter and/or show greater understanding of the nature of science, because they would consciously or unconsciously recognize the arbitrary nature of line-drawing. And unfortunately, one good way to resolve that discomfort would then be to discredit the scientific method.


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Credit: UK Government

Credit: UK Government

Note: I have joined the “virtual class” component of Dan Kahan‘s Science of Science Communication course at Yale University. As part of this I am endeavoring to write a response paper in reaction to each week’s set of readings. I will post these responses here on my blog – my paper for week nine is below. Previous responses are here. I will also be participating in the discussion on Kahan’s own blog.

This week’s (well, last week’s) reading focused on synthetic biology. Dan invited us to imagine that the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy had asked us to study the public’s likely reaction to this emerging technology. What kind of studies would we do?

The readings were:

Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues. New Directions: The Ethics of Synthetic Biology and Emerging Technologies (December 2010).

Pauwels, E. Review of quantitative and qualitative studies on U.S. public perceptions of synthetic biology. Syst Synth Biol 3, 37-46 (2009).

Dragojlovic, N. & Einsiedel, E. Playing God or just unnatural? Religious beliefs and approval of synthetic biology. Public Understanding of Science 22, 869-885 (published online 2012, version of record 2013 – for convenience’s sake, I will refer to this as “Dragojlovic 2012”)

Dragojlovic, N. & Einsiedel, E. Framing Synthetic Biology: Evolutionary Distance, Conceptions of Nature, and the Unnaturalness Objection. Science Communication (2013)

I want to start off by taking stock: listing what we appear to know already, based on this week’s readings, and then figure out what outstanding questions remain.

What we know(ish)

Here’s a summary of findings from the readings (roughly organized from strongest evidence base to weakest):

  • Most people know little or nothing about synthetic biology (Pauwels)
  • The familiarity argument – that as people become more familiar with a technology, their support for the technology will increase – is not well supported (Pauwels, others)
  • For many people, synthetic biology provokes concerns about “playing God” and who has the right to “create life” (Pauwels, Dragojlovic 2012)
  • Framing for synthetic biology is similar to that for cloning, genetic engineering and stem cell research (Pauwels)
  • Domain of application has an effect on framing (Pauwels)
  • Acceptance of risk-benefit tradeoff depends on oversight structure that can manage unknowns, human and environmental concerns, and long-term effects (Pauwels)
  • Belief in God increases disapproval of synbio through two mechanisms – the idea (among weak believers) that genetic manipulation interferes with nature, and the idea (among strong believers) of encroachment on divine prerogative (Dragojlovic 2012)
  • Framing synbio as “unnatural” leads to negative perceptions only when characteristics of the particular technological application – eg, evolutionary distance between DNA donor and DNA host – increase perceived relevance of such arguments (Dragojlovic 2013)
  • Individuals who view nature as sacred or spiritual are most responsive to unnaturalness framing (Dragojlovic 2013)

Now, to answer the questions – via a little additional reading.


Part 1: Single study

The question:

Imagine you were asked by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy to do a single study to help forecast the public’s likely reaction to synthetic biology. What sort of study would you do?”

At this juncture, it is probably more useful to model the general reactions people have and the associations they make when they learn about synthetic biology, rather than simply polling their support for the technology. (As we previously discussed, there’s little external validity to questions asking for opinions on something that most respondents don’t understand.)

I think the starting point would have to be more qualitative studies (or – cheating a bit – a mixed-methods study that starts with a qualitative phase). There seems to be little sense in creating a quantitative study in which the choices of responses are simply sentiments that we guessed people would entertain – far better to convene focus groups and see what sentiments people actually entertain. This would lay the groundwork for more informed quantitative studies.

Among the reading for this week, the only qualitative research was the pair of Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars studies discussed in Pauwels. These produced some insights – but as Pauwels points out, “The most important conclusion of this article is the need for additional investigation of different factors that will shape public perceptions about synthetic biology, its potential benefits, and its potential risks.”

Some of this work has now been carried out.

Looking beyond the week’s reading, I see that the Wilson Center has continued to carry out both qualitative and quantitative studies, some of which Pauwels summarized in a 2013 paper, “Public Understanding of Synthetic Biology.

Her major findings were:

  • Before hearing a definition of synthetic biology and learning about its applications, participants tended to describe synbio through comparisons to other biotechnology, such as cloning, genetic engineering and stem cell research. This could be crucial to understanding the ways that public debate about synbio might evolve, Pauwels contends.
  • Participants – even some of those generally positive about synthetic biology – expressed concerns about unintended consequences. (Interesting to note that some of these concerns came up when discussing genetically modified mosquitoes, a topic from a previous week in this class.)
  • Participants’ value judgment about synthetic biology varied depending on the technology’s proposed application. If the proposed application was in an environment that appeared more contained, participants were less concerned about risks.
  • Participants expressed ambivalence about engineering life. These attitudes take the form not only of the much-discussed unease at “creating life” and “playing God,” but also much more generalized anxiety – “this term makes me feel scared.”

This is is a very good start, but I feel there’s a bit more unpacking a qualitative study could do.

For example, under “ambivalence toward engineering life,” Pauwels includes the following reactions from participants:

It could also be dangerous if we do not research it enough to find out any long­term effects.”

“This could lead to huge scientific advances, but it can also lead to countries or people using it for their own ‘evil agendas.’ It reminds me of Jurassic Park.”

“It seems exciting but makes me somewhat uncomfortable. Where are the limits?”

“It sounds like we are playing God. Who are we as humans to think [that] we can design or redesign life? It might be nice to be able to do so, but is it right? It seems [that] there are many ethical and moral issues. Perhaps we are getting too arrogant.”

“I feel concerned because, not being perfect, we believe we know what is best in creating life. As in science­ fiction movies, when we do—in time—it goes in a direction we didn’t think about… I believe [that] when life is created, it is meant to be created that way for a purpose we may not even know right now.”

There are many underlying fears and concerns there, expressed in various combinations. These include concerns about unknowables (to coin a phrase, both known unknowns and unknown unknowns), longterm effects, human and scientific hubris, immoral applications by bad actors, security, unnaturalness, and violations of nature or of God’s dominion. There’s also an implied recognition (“where are the limits?” “many ethical and moral issues”) of the need to prevent technological applications that exceed society’s moral norms, and of the potential of technological advances to change the very locus of our morality.

I’m particular concerned with the need to explore the public’s feelings on moral limits. So far studies of the public’s moral objections to synthetic biology has focused on intrinsic moral objections (it is wrong to usurp God’s position as creator) rather than extrinsic moral objections (certain applications would be morally problematic). This seems strange given that as a society we have already collectively recognized some biotech applications as unethical – most notably, human cloning. It therefore seems imperative to explore public opinion on the subject, and try to separate measures of intrinsic and extrinsic moral objection.

With this preliminary information at hand, the most useful question to ask next is which of these attitudes, or general sets of attitudes, is most responsible for a negative predisposition to synthetic biology.

Part 2: More studies

The question:

Imagine you conducted the first study and the OSTP said, “wow, that’s a great start, one that convinces us that we need to do a lot more. We’d like you to outline a comprehensive program of empirical study—consisting of as many individual studies, building progressively on each other, as you like—with a budget of $25 million and a lifespan of 36 months.” What might such a program look like?”

I would propose a series of quantitative studies that would seek to model a situation in which citizens learn about synthetic biology, and then seek establish the frequency of the ideas and opinions expressed in the qualitative study.

Participants would be given a basic description of synthetic biology, and would then be asked to agree or disagree with the following (or perhaps, indicate their level of agreement on a multi-point scale):

  • Synthetic biology is unnatural.
  • Those who practice synthetic biology are playing God.
  • Synthetic biology scares me.
  • Synthetic biology just feels wrong.
  • If we start using synthetic biology, we may not be able to control the consequences. (With variations for environment, human health, security.)
  • I’m concerned that we don’t know what the long-term effects of synthetic biology will be. (With variations for environment, human health, security.)
  • Synthetic biology holds great promise.
  • Synthetic biology is exciting.
  • Synthetic biology could improve people’s lives.
  • Etc.

Potentially a great deal could be learned just in the correlation between these responses. For example, are there many respondents who say synthetic biology “just feels wrong,” but don’t agree with any of the usual-suspect statements about why it feels wrong? This indicates either that synthetic biology taps into a deep-seated fear that people find difficult to attribute cause or voice to – or perhaps that thre is an expressible reason for their misgiving that we haven’t yet succeeded in drawing out of qualitative study participants.

Another hypothesis to explore: perhaps this a strong correlation between unnatural/playing God responses and fear of unintended consequences. This may indicate that expressions such as “playing God” are sometimes used less to express a religious or spiritual conviction, and more to express a sense of humanity’s hubris.

It would be useful to pair these questions with a five-point measure of respondents’ support for synthetic biology, to try and determine the relationship between support strength and various attitudes.

I think it could also be useful to ask a series of questions that attempt to get at the way people make risk-benefit analyses about synthetic biology. This may also have an interesting bearing on their level of support. (As Dragojlovic (2012) points out, a key further question to arise from that study was, how do we consider risk-benefit trade-offs in way that accommodates value-based risks?) Participants could be asked to agree or disagree (on a five-point scale) with the following:

  • The risks of synthetic biology outweigh the benefits.
  • The benefits of synthetic biology outweigh the risks.
  • There is no acceptable level of risk for a technology or product. (Perhaps ask variations on this tailored to human health, environment, etc.)
  • The best way to judge whether we should use a technology is to weigh the benefits against the risks.
  • It doesn’t matter what the benefits or risks of a technology are; if it’s unethical, we shouldn’t use it.
  • The “rightness” or “wrongness” of synthetic biology depends on how it’s used.

Etc, etc – that’s an imperfect start, for sure, but I think with the right questions we could get into an interesting area of psychology.

Outstanding questions

There is, of course, much more that can be investigated. Here were the major area that Pauwels and Dragojlovic highlighted as ripe for future research – along with a few extra thoughts of my own.

  • We need further investigation of factors that will shape public perceptions about synthetic biology, and its benefits and risks (Pauwels). I think this is key – several of the studies we read followed up on “playing God”/”creation of life” concerns, but these concerns are probably only responsible for a small proportion of objections to synthetic biology. In Dragojlovic 2013, the baseline model, which included only the experimental manipulations (unnaturalness framing, evolutionary distance and so on), explained about 5% of variance in attitudes. This, Dragojlovic says, shows that most attitude variance is due to other factors.
  • Pauwels asks about nature of claims raised by “playing God”/”creation of life” concerns: “does it refer to polarization involving broad cultural/philosophical dimensions or to polarization strictly linked to religious values?” Dragojlovic 2012 illuminates some aspects of this but leaves further questions on table. Intriguingly, the Presidential Commission says it “learned that secular critics of the field are more likely to use the phrase “playing God” than are religious groups.” This may hold true only for organizational leaders and not for the populace at large, but it still neatly points out the importance of separating the religious and philosophical/cultural dimensions of the “playing God objection.”
  • Note that Dragojlovic 2012 was carried out in Europe – so a similar study of religious objections carried out in the US could yield quite different results.
  • What constitute effective counter-arguments to the unnaturalness objection? (Dragojlovic 2013)
  • Identify conditions under which advocates and opponents of emerging technology can use rhetorical frames to shape how citizens perceive the technology (Dragojlovic 2013)
  • Who is more or less likely to be swayed out of the unnaturalness objection – the religious or the irreligious?
  • What is the relationship between the “unnaturalness” and “playing God” objections? It seems like there is a lot of overlap, but an effective communications strategy would surely depend on understanding how each interacts with personal identity, which are simply immutable and which more finely shaded, etc.

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Note: I have joined the “virtual class” component of Dan Kahan‘s Science of Science Communication course at Yale University. As part of this I am endeavoring to write a response paper in reaction to each week’s set of readings. I will post these responses here on my blog – my paper for week seven is below. Previous responses are here.

I will also be participating in the discussion on Kahan’s own blog.

Here was our assignment for week 7:

Imagine you were

  1. President Obama about to make a speech to the Nation in support of your proposal for a carbon tax;
  2. a zoning board member in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, preparing to give a presentation at an open meeting (at which members of the public would be briefed and then allowed to give comments) defending a proposed set of guidelines on climate-impact “vulnerability reduction measures for all new construction, redevelopment and infrastructure such as additional hardening, higher floor elevations or incorporation of natural infrastructure for increased resilience”;
  3. a climate scientist invited to give a lecture on climate change to the local chapter of the Kiwanis in Springfield, Tennessee; or
  4. a “communications consultant” hired by a billionaire, to create a television advertisement, to be run during the Superbowl, that will promote constructive public engagement with the science on and issues posed by climate change.

Would the CRED manual be useful to you? Would the studies conducted by Feygina, et al., Meyers et al., or Kahan et al. be? How would you advise any one of these actors to proceed?

The readings 

First, some thoughts on these four readings.

The CRED Manual: well-intentioned, but flawed2015-02-27_10-42-04

Source material: Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University. “The Psychology of Climate Change Communication: A guide for scientists, journalists, educators, political aides, and the interested public.”

When I first read the CRED manual, it chimed well with my sensibilities. My initial reaction was that this was a valuable, well-prepared document. But on closer inspection, I have misgivings. I think a lot of that “chiming” comes from the manual’s references to well-known psychological phenomena that science communicators and the media have tossed around as potential culprits for climate change denialism. But for a lot of these psychological processes, there isn’t much empirical basis showing their relevance to climate change communication.

Of course, the CRED staff undoubtedly know the literature better than I do, so they could well know empirical support that I’m not aware of. But the manual authors often don’t support their contentions with research citations. That’s a shame because much of the advice given is too surface-level for communications practitioners to directly apply to their work, and the missing citations would have helped practitioners to look more deeply into and understand particular tactics.

Let’s not talk about it

In particular I would put to one side much of the CRED recommendations to do with: 

Framing: Some of these seem like assumptions. “College students are concerned with green jobs” – how do we know? In addition, Myers’ work (see below) suggests that the suggestion of a “national security” frame is ill-advised – as is this:

“Communicators may find it useful to prepare numerous frames ahead of time, including climate change as a religious, youth, or economic issue.”

The method should not be to try whatever framing seems plausible and see what sticks – unless we’re doing that as part of a controlled field experiment.

Correcting misconceptions. The CRED manual says communicators should discover what misconceptions their audience has about climate change, and “replace” them “with new facts.” Is this doable? How would one replace erroneous information with new facts? The reasoning here sounds a little too close to the discredited information deficit model.

The authors go on to cite an example from some of their own research, concluding that communicators should try to correct misapprehensions because they lead the public to support inappropriate solutions, such as banning aerosols. Does this matter? I’d argue quite possibly not, because the most pressing science communication concern is arguably just getting people to believe in climate change, thus giving mandate to policy makers (who will choose from more viable solutions – there’s no suggestion that anyone is lobbying for them to ban aerosols).

What’s missing?

It’s highly surprising that the CRED manual doesn’t talk about ideological polarization and the types of messaging that might appeal to these different populations. This seems to me to be the area of climate communication research with the strongest empirical backing.

What’s left?

Not having read the underlying research, I am not sure how much credence I should give to the rest of the CRED recommendations – and there’s a lot of them. Notably:

  • Talk about avoiding losses rather than seeking gains
  • Choose a promotion or prevention focus for your messaging (although the above advice suggests we should focus on prevention!)
  • Work to prevent the single-action bias
  • Be careful what words you use to communicate uncertainty
  • Invoke the precautionary principle
  • Focus on immediate threats
  • Frame climate change as a local issue (CRED doesn’t give a citation, but Myers cites Hart and Nisbet 2011, O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole 2009)
  • Tap into emotion: CRED essentially advises climate communicators to appeal to both reason and emotion – but also to be aware of the pitfalls of appealing to emotion too much. It’s not clear how communicators are supposed to dig their way out of this conundrum.

Accordingly, I’m going to cheat a bit on the assignment and just make the following blanket statement: I won’t recommend that any of the speakers in this thought experiment read the CRED manual. There are, for me, too many uncertainties about its advice. But a more widely read communications researcher could probably go through the manual and revise it in a way that would be useful for our speakers.

Feygina’s system justification thesis

Source material: Feygina, Jost and Goldsmith. “System Justification, the Denial of Global Warming, and the Possibility of ‘System-Sanctioned Change.

The authors found that much of the effects of political conservatism and gender on environmental denialism can be explained by the subjects’ tendency to defend the societal and economic status quo. They also concluded that it is possible to eliminate the negative effect of this “system justification” by providing statements that frame environmental protection as patriotic and consistent with protecting the status quo.

I had some qualms with this paper’s findings – in particular Study 3, which examined the effect of presenting a system-preservation message (“being pro-environmental allows us to protect and preserve the American way of life,” etc.). The study used a sample size of just 41 and seems subject to the demand effect.

Myers’ public health framing

Source material: Myers, Nisbet, Maibach and Leiserowitz. “A public health frame arouses hopeful emotions about climate change.

The authors studied the effects of three climate change-related messages that framed the problem variously in terms of the environment, health and national security. Disaggregating the subjects into segments according to climate change knowledge, attitudes and behavior (with the six segments dubbed Alarmed, Concerned, Cautious, Disengaged, Doutbful and Dismissive), Myers found that a public health frame created the most hopeful response in a majority of these populations. She also found that the national security frame was most likely to generate anger, especially among the Dismissive and Doubtful.

Kahan: geoengineering and polarization

Source material: Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, Tarantola, Silva and Braman. “Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-Channel Model of Science Communication.”

The researchers found they could offset cultural polarization over the validity of climate change by replacing a message advocating a lower atmospheric CO2 threshold with one in which scientists called for greater investment in geoengineering – applied technologies directed at combating climate change. Contrary to a competing hypothesis, Kahan et al found that subjects receiving information about geoengineering were slightly more concerned about climate change than were those in a control condition.

My main concern here is, why would geoengineering calm the polarizing effect of climate communication if renewable energy and other green technologies have not previously achieved this? The method – as Kahan puts it, “valorizing the use of human ingenuity” – is the same.

I also have serious reservations about the advisability of putting too much emphasis on geoengineering in the public discourse. The more airtime we give to this idea, the more legitimacy we lend it. And while geoengineering is certainly something that scientists should explore, right now it seems like it should be very far down our list of policy and funding priorities. There are many technologies for energy generation, improved electricity distribution and energy storage that are much closer to fruition than any proposed geoengineering technology, without the very serious risk of unknown side effects that geoengineering poses.

What to say?

Now, on to the assignment proper – my suggestions for our speakers:

President Obama

Some of the study results suggest Obama should modify his message to appeal to voters not already on his side. 

Meyers’ work suggests President Obama could try to emphasize the public health benefits of his proposal, and the administration already seems to have got the memo on that. Obama should not, however, use a national security angle, which is likely to anger those most skeptical about anthropogenic climate change. Feygina’s work suggests that additionally, Obama could talk about his proposal as a means of protecting the “American way of life,” i.e. the status quo. Obama could try reframing the proposal as a form of system maintenance rather than radical change – perhaps he could talk about his proposal as a natural extension of the previous cap and trade system introduced by a Republican president. Not surprisingly, Obama has tried this too, although perhaps he hasn’t stressed the point enough.

Kahan’s findings could be applicable on a broad scale – not to suggest that Obama should speak about geoengineering specifcally, since that’s not his policy aim; but that part of his reframing effort could include talk of human ingenuity. Once again, I think this has been tried, in the context of renewable technologies.

By his very role, and by public perceptions, Obama is rather hamstrung. He can’t really de-politicize his message. Feygina’s study notes (the abstract is actually a bit misleading on this point) that system justification did not fully account for political orientation’s effect on environmental attitudes, and suggests that “top down” factors such as official party platforms are also at work. There’s also the possibility that when Obama engages in re-framing (such as talking about making the US more secure, by reducing dependence on foreign oil), this is seen by conservative voters as a transparent ploy. Myers notes that important factors in real world communication, not reflected in her experiment, include the congruence between messenger and frame.

Zoning board member

The key for this official is that he doesn’t really have to mention “climate change” at all. I’m not suggesting that he suppress such talk, but it’s really not necessary to get the adaptation measures passed. The term “climate change” is inherently polarizing, and people can recognize the need to protect infrastructure from storms with or without a belief in man-made global warming.

Myers’ study suggests it may be useful for the board member to use a public health frame for the discussion, which would be natural when one is talking about the need to safeguard against flooding, etc. Feygina’s recommendations would also be easy to accommodate, as climate change adaptation on a broad scale involves protecting the “status quo” (ie, protecting the city against the forces of nature), although property owners and politicians may in reality have to start doing things very differently. It proabbly wouldn’t hurt to emphasize the human ingenuity and industry aspects of the officials’ approach, but this may not strictly be necessary as without talk of “climate change,” there may not be polarizing language in need of neutralization.


Kiwanis International is a service club that emphasizes efforts to improve children’s lives. Feygina’s recommendations may or may not be necessary here, depending on the system-protection beliefs of the participants – but putting them into practice probably wouldn’t hurt. Myers’ work would point towards using a health frame here, perhaps focusing on preserving environmental quality to reduce childhood asthma, etc., and I see little drawback to doing so. Kahan’s work suggests that making reference to human ingenuity could help to neutralize some of the polarization that talk of climate would have on the more hiearchical/individualist members of the organization, though I have concerns about over-emphasis on geoengineering, as discussed above. 

Superbowl ad consultant

Feygina’s work would be useful because the ad must appeal to a broad spectrum of Americans, including those averse to changing the status quo. Again I see health framing as useful and don’t see any obvious drawbacks to such an approach; likewise an emphasis on human ingenuity. My concerns about geoengineering, outlined above, are even stronger for the ad than for a one-off talk at a Kiwanis club, since the message would reach many millions of people and be repeated often, thereby completely exaggerating the importance of geoengineering within the range of climate change approaches.

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